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Abstract 
Global integration is driving a convergence of economies and markets; however, the 
benefits of integration, in the form of economic growth, are not evenly distributed.  Small 
developing nations face tremendous competitive pressures and do not always posses the 
infrastructure, policy, and characteristics to engage in trade without risking increases in 
poverty and inequality.  Nicaragua shares many characteristics of other small developing 
nations, and is currently embarking on a strategy to increase its participation in the large 
global market for business process outsourcing (BPO) services.  The nascent Nicaraguan 
contact center industry, and its combination of advanced production processes and higher 
order labor skills, can be viewed as an entry-level strategy for increasing Nicaragua’s 
participation in the global knowledge economy.  An innovative strategy of the 
Nicaraguan government was to invest in the infrastructure of a world class contact center 
facility to attract a large multinational corporation.  The unintended result was the 
formation of a joint venture between a Nicaraguan and Danish firm that includes support 
from the Danish government to establish a training institution which would serve the 
entire industry.  This public-private partnership has the potential to enable the growth of 
the Nicaraguan contact center industry, which can create backward linkages with 
domestic suppliers and spillovers that can benefit the development of other knowledge-
based industries.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Meenu Tewari, for her insight, instruction, and 
encouragement in pursuing this study.  Her comments and guidance on previous drafts 
have contributed greatly to my own learning and the final result of this project. 
 
I would also like to recognize the contributions and participation of the many people who 
supported my efforts.  Dr. Luis Sanz was very generous in sharing his time and providing 
introductions to his colleagues within the community of Central American Scholars.  Dr. 
Alberto Trejos helped clarify the differences between the economic development of 
Costa Rica and Nicaragua, and illuminated the particular dynamics of the region to be 
considered when assessing development strategy.  Sr. Guillermo Jacoby provided crucial 
information on the role of government and education institutions in supporting the growth 
of technology industries.  I am grateful to Srs. Ricardo Terán S. and Rodrigo Navarro for 
sharing the story of Press2 and helping me understand the competitive position of 
Nicaraguan contact centers.  Juan Carlos Pereira graciously shared his time and insights 
to the development and functions of ProNicaragua.  Dr. Scott Rockart, at the Fuqua 
School of Business, provided vital instruction and feedback for developing the conceptual 
systems framework.  Paul Davidson provided me with numerous contacts, feedback on 
ideas, and valuable sources of information and data in Nicaragua.  Ricardo Terán T. was 
a generous host during my travels to Nicaragua, and helped me organize my research 
activities and reach important stakeholders in the contact center industry.  I also would 
like to thank Mike Beyer-Pedersen and Morten K. Christiansen of Vejle Business College 
in Denmark for sharing their observations about the training and development of the 
contact center workforce.  Gracias a todos.      
 
I owe my deepest gratitude and appreciation to my wife, Dr. Amber K. Gove, who has 
supported me on all levels during this project and my graduate studies in general.  Along 
with helping me work through different ideas and research frameworks for this study, she 
provided valuable insight and expertise on the Nicaraguan education system.  She is an 
inspiration and my best friend. 
 iii
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
BPO Business Process Outsourcing 
CEPAL Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
CINDE Costa Rican Coalition of Development Initiatives  
CLACDS Latin American Center for Competitiveness and Sustainable Development 
CNZF National Commission of Free Zones (Nicaragua) 
DR-CAFTA Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement 
EPZ Export Processing Zone 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
FIAS Foreign Investment Advisory Service 
HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Country 
IADB Inter-American Development Bank 
ICT Information and Communication Technolgy 
IDA Industrial Development Agency 
IFU The Danish government Development Agency 
INATEC National Technical Institute (Nicaragua) 
INCAE The Central American Business School 
INPYME Nicaraguan Institute for Small and Medium sized Enterprises 
IPA Investment Promotion Agency 
LAC Latin America and the Caribbean 
LDC Less Developed Country 
MIFIC Ministry of Industry and Commerce (Nicaragua)  
MNE Multinational Enterprise 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
SME Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise 
UAM American University of Managua (Nicaragua) 
UCA Central American University (Nicaragua) 
UNAN National Autonomous University (Nicaragua) 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNDP United Nations Development Program 
UNI National University of Engineering (Nicaragua) 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
WTO World Trade Organization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv
 
Map of Nicaragua and its Relative Proximity to North America 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v
 
Table of Contents 
 
1. Introduction....................................................................................................... 1 
2. Nicaraguan Challenges in the Age of Global Convergence…………………6 
3. Nicaragua and BPO Services………………………………………………… 9 
3.1. The Changing Nature of Service Activities……………………………...... 9 
3.2. Firm Choice in Offshoring………………………………………………… 10 
3.3. Contact Center Operations………………………………………………… 11 
3.4. Advantages for Nicaraguan Contact Centers……………………………… 12 
3.5. Variety in Service Provision………………………………………………. 14 
3.6. Performance Improvement………………………………………………... 15 
3.7. Implications for Nicaraguan Contact Centers……………………………... 16 
3.8. Framework for Contact Center Industry Growth………………………….. 16 
4. Establishing a Contact Center in Nicaragua – The Case of Press2……….. 18 
5. The Role of Policy in Cultivating the Industry……………………………... 22 
5.1. Incentives for Investment…………………………………………………..23 
5.2. Export Processing Zones………………………………………………….. 24 
6. ProNicaragua as Market Advocate for Contact Centers………………….. 26 
7. Human Capital Formation…………………………………………………… 31 
7.1. The Importance of Basic Education………………………………………. 33 
7.2. Post-Secondary Education and Training Institutions………………………33 
7.3. Enterprise and Third-Party Training………………………………………. 35 
8. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………….. 38 
9. References Cited……………………………………………………………….41 
10.   Appendix…………………………………………………………………….. 47 
 
 
 - 1 -
Section 1:  Introduction 
 
Global integration, fueled by advances in transport and information and communication 
technologies (ICT), is driving a convergence of economies, cultures, and markets.  More 
developed nations are realizing benefits of this integration in the form of economic 
growth and expansion of knowledge-based industries.  These benefits, however, are not 
evenly distributed.  While larger nations like Mexico, China, India, and the East Asian 
“Tigers” have found a successful footing in the global economy, other smaller developing 
nations face tremendous competitive pressures in global markets.  They do not always 
posses the infrastructure, policies, and necessary characteristics to engage in global trade 
without risking an increase in poverty and inequality.  In these circumstances, export-
oriented activities can take the form of economic enclaves with little knowledge diffusion 
or backward linkages in the local economy. 
 
This paper proposes to use Nicaragua as an illustration of how a nation with medium 
human development confronts the challenges of global integration, with a specific focus 
on the potential of the Nicaraguan contact center industry to grow and increase 
Nicaragua’s participation in the global trade of Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) 
services.  Nicaragua currently has five contact centers delivering basic levels of BPO 
services.  The growth of this industry and the combination of advanced production 
processes and higher order skills required of the labor force can be viewed as an entry-
level strategy for increasing Nicaragua’s participation in the global knowledge economy.   
 
Nicaragua shares many characteristics of other small developing nations, with poor 
infrastructure and medium-to-low levels of human development.  Its per capita Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of $819 is the lowest in Central America, and almost 56 percent 
of its 5.5 million people are below the national poverty line (CEPAL, 2006).  Education 
attainment is low, with the average citizen attending less than five years of school 
(USAID, 2006).  Also, the national debt burden warranted Nicaragua being named a 
Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) by the World Bank.  There are large 
discrepancies between urban and rural economic activity, with poverty being more 
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extreme in rural areas.  Job creation and employment are persistent problems, with 
unemployment in the formal sector estimated to be 9.3 percent and underemployment, 
46.5 percent (CEPAL, 2006 & CIA World Fact Book, 2006).     
 
On the other hand, Nicaragua enjoys favorable proximity to North American markets.  In 
the 1990s, following a decade of revolution and civil war, Nicaragua made moves toward 
rapid integration and significantly increased exporting activities in apparel, textiles, and 
simple manufactured goods.  The Nicaraguan economy, however, did not grow under 
expanded trade as it approached the millennium, as per capita GDP decreased (CEPAL, 
2006).  This trend has reversed since 2000; however, it has been at a lower level that that 
of other new globalizers.  For example, while Nicaragua’s GDP increased by less than 
five percent, Costa Rica’s increased by over seven percent.   
 
Most of this contemporary growth in Nicaragua has occurred under a regime of export 
processing zones (EPZs), managed by the Comisión Nacional de Zonas Francas (CNZF).  
The number of companies operating in EPZs has increased from five in 1992 to almost 
100 by mid-2005 (ProNicaragua, 2006).  Employment in EPZs has increased from 
20,000 jobs in 1999 to over 80,000 in 2006, representing the largest source of 
employment growth in Nicaragua during a seven-year period (See Appendix 1 for EPZ 
Employment). While Nicaragua has 33 EPZ industrial parks, it also permits firms to 
operate as stand-alone EPZs, a flexible policy feature that is the primary vehicle for 
establishing contact centers. 
 
A diaspora, resulting from the civil war of the 1980s, created a population of over 
400,000 Nicaraguans that lived in North America and gained Western education and 
familiarity with Northern business customs (Proctor, 2006).  Local economic 
development professionals are hoping that the affect of the diaspora on Nicaraguan 
industrial development will follow the pattern described by AnnaLee Saxenian, where 
“brain drain” evolves from being a curse into an asset of “brain circulation” (Saxenian, 
2000).  Since 1990, many of these people have returned to Nicaragua, with a desire to re-
establish themselves in their homeland.  As a result, there is both an emerging class of 
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Nicaraguan entrepreneurs and individuals who are employed as representatives of 
multinational corporations with operations in Nicaragua.   
 
In 2005, Nicaragua ratified the Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), 
which will provide an opportunity for Nicaragua to attract increased Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), create jobs, and strengthen economic development.  An additional 
benefit is that intellectual property is protected via the agreement.  This can improve the 
investment climate by reducing the risk of U.S. firms seeking offshore providers for more 
knowledge-intensive services.   
 
To further assist the attraction of FDI, Nicaragua established an Investment Promotion 
Agency (IPA), ProNicaragua, in 2002, which was modeled on successful institutions in 
Ireland (IDA) and Costa Rica (CINDE).  CINDE is widely credited for its role in 
bringing an INTEL chip manufacturing plant to Costa Rica, and assisting the strategy to 
develop a consumer electronics cluster (Porter and Ketelhöhn, 2002A).  ProNicaragua is 
staffed by professionals with international business experience, and has played a key role 
in evangelizing the benefits of Nicaragua as a destination for offshore BPO services.  
 
To spur further growth, Nicaragua is trying to capitalize on changes in global production 
systems and the increase in tradable services, by entering the immense global market for 
BPO services via the contact center industry.  Contact centers provide a collection of 
resources that serve as an interface between a service provider and its customers (Whitt, 
2002).  Currently, call centers are some of the most recognized forms of contact centers; 
however, advancements of ICT have created different mediums for customer contact, and 
the industry is more nuanced than simple phone-based services.  BPO is the practice 
where firms use specialized employees or third-party providers to provide services that 
can be disaggregated from core firm operations (Papinniemi et al., 2005).  Cost savings 
are the primary driver for offshoring these services, and some common examples of BPO 
services include sales, customer service, accounting, information technology (IT) support, 
payroll, software development, and human resources functions.   
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Many developing nations are inspired by the success of India, which booked $22 billion 
in BPO business in 2005, and created 1.3 million jobs over the last ten years 
(Businessweek, January 30, 2006).  Additionally, the McKinsey Global Institute (2005) 
projects that by 2008, 160 million jobs, or about 11 percent of 1.46 billion global service 
jobs, could theoretically be performed remotely barring any constraints on supply.  
Service activities with high potential for offshoring include engineering, finance and 
accounting, generalist, and support staff.  McKinsey’s projection theorizes that as many 
as 26 million generalist and support staff jobs, the immediate opportunity for countries 
like Nicaragua, could be candidates for offshoring by 2008.   
 
Nicaragua and this paper are focused upon activities that are located offshore and 
outsourced to a third party, although some firms may choose to locate captive (producer-
owned) units in offshore locations.  These activities have a strong link to the relocation of 
labor from high-wage to low-wage countries, and offer the greatest opportunity for 
developing countries to enter the global BPO trade. 
 
The rise of this nascent industry in Nicaragua includes an innovative government 
investment to develop a world-class contact center.  Initially intended as a facility to 
attract a Fortune 100 client firm, the project has evolved into a joint venture with a 
Nicaraguan and Danish firm called Press2.  The unintended outcome of this capital 
investment has yielded a project that may have significant long-term benefits for the 
industry in Nicaragua.  Rather than leasing the facility to a large multinational enterprise 
(MNE), which is more likely to tightly manage service provision within its own 
production chain, Press2 has joined a local firm and a global firm with vast industry 
experience to create a venture with a higher probability of diffusing its expertise locally.  
Providing services to multiple foreign firms, and adopting best practices learned 
elsewhere, can increase the probability of spillovers and knowledge transfer from this 
joint venture to other local firms and the labor force.  Additionally, the Danish 
government is providing financial and technical support for the development of an 
independent training center that could serve the entire industry and facilitate the 
necessary workforce development for high-quality service provision and industry growth. 
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I argue in this paper that the growth of the contact center industry, and the combination of 
advanced production processes and higher order of skills required of the labor force, can 
be viewed as an entry-level strategy for increasing Nicaragua’s participation in the global 
knowledge economy.  Sophisticated contact centers with a technically-skilled labor force 
can attract additional investment from MNEs that enable further diffusion of knowledge 
and technologies.  With a high percentage of local ownership of contact centers, foreign 
investment and successful growth of the industry in Nicaragua can foster greater 
backward linkages (Hirschman, 1950) than have been observed in the country’s existing 
export activities in apparel and textiles.  Such growth can also drive the demand for labor 
and could create stronger associations between local firms and policy and educational 
intermediaries to increase the quality and variety of labor skills. Growing skills and 
developing increasingly sophisticated capabilities in the workplace can also have 
spillover effects into other technical industries.  
 
The methodology of this study encompasses both primary and secondary sources of 
information and data.  Research of scholarly journals and studies from international 
development institutions was conducted to explore the theories and impacts of global 
trade, development policy, and various strategies of other small developing nations.  
Trade journals, academic research, and business media were consulted for insights into 
the growth of the global contact center industry and trade in BPO services.  Available 
secondary data was used for descriptive analysis of technological development in 
Nicaragua and comparable nations.  Because the Nicaraguan contact center industry is in 
its infancy, a series of interviews were conducted with industry leaders, scholars, and 
economic development professionals from Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Denmark in late 
2006 and early 2007.  These interviews helped clarify the current state of development in 
Nicaragua, and offered insights into the specific local conditions that will influence the 
growth of the contact center industry.   
   
This paper will present the case of the Nicaraguan contact center industry in the 
following manner.  Section 2 will describe the challenges for small developing nations to 
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adapt to global integration, by presenting these challenges in the Nicaraguan context.  
Section 3 specifically addresses the global market for BPO services and the role of 
contact centers within it.  It discusses the opportunities and aspirations for Nicaraguan 
firms to enter this market, and presents a conceptual framework for understanding the 
variables that could influence the potential growth of the local contact center industry.  
Section 4 details the specific case of Press2 as an example of how governments can 
pursue innovative demand-side strategies for attracting FDI and enabling knowledge-
based economic activity.   
 
The remaining sections will address the factors which will most directly influence the 
growth of the contact industry in Nicaragua.  Section 5 addresses the role of policy 
instruments in facilitating trade in BPO services, attracting high-quality foreign 
investment, and overcoming market imperfections.  Section 6 describes the importance of 
ProNicaragua as an intermediary for promoting investment, and presents examples of 
how other nations have used similar intermediaries to attract FDI and create linkages with 
domestic industries in the global knowledge economy.  Section 7 highlights the 
importance of human capital formation and the cultivation of a technically skilled labor 
force for the contact center industry.  It also describes existing education and training 
institutions and presents an argument for expanding training capacity in Nicaragua and 
creating stronger links between industry and training institutions.  Section 8 offers 
recommendations for strengthening the potential for growth of the contact center industry 
in Nicaragua.        
 
 
Section 2:  Nicaraguan Challenges in the Age of Global Convergence 
 
The steady proliferation of free trade is the primary driver of global integration.  This 
results in an increasing interdependence between nations, reinforced by the convergence 
in production practices, the rapid movement of capital, and human migration.  Proponents 
of globalization advocate that this trend helps reduce poverty in integrated economies via 
accelerated and diffused growth (World Bank, 2002).   World Trade Organization (WTO) 
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statistics from 2000 to 2005 show that exports from Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) 
increased 18 percent and imports increased by 15 percent during the period.  There is also 
evidence that a one percent increase in the ratio of exports to GDP is associated with a 
marginal increase in wages of greater than one percent (Freeman et al., 2001).  As low-
income countries enter into global manufacturing and services markets, proponents state 
that increases in labor productivity will help poor people transition from the vulnerability 
of poverty to better jobs.   
 
A strong critique of globalization, however, is that the costs and benefits of trade have 
been unevenly distributed across and within countries, perpetuating a pattern of global 
development that builds prosperity for some while deepening poverty and inequality for 
others (World Bank, 2002).  It is estimated that one-fifth of the global population 
survives on $2 per day, while another fifth struggles with less than $1 per day (UNDP, 
2005).  In contrast to some large developing countries, many small developing nations 
must simultaneously balance resources for combating extreme poverty and increasing 
their ability to compete in global markets.  Nicaragua’s 2006 national budget was 
approximately $328 million (Ministerio de la Hacienda, 2006), compared to almost $2 
billion in Costa Rica (CEPAL) and $256 billion in Brazil (IBGE). 
 
Some of the inequality between trading nations can be attributed to the uneven adaptation 
of global integration strategies.  Widespread integration began around 1980, and larger 
developing countries like India, China, Brazil, and Mexico greatly increased their 
participation in the global economy, and lead some 24 developing countries which have 
doubled their ratio of trade to income over this period (World Bank, 2002).  Nicaragua 
looks up to nations like Ireland, Costa Rica, and South Korea as examples of successful 
small nations; however, it lacks the infrastructure, education system, and financial 
resources to equally compete in increasingly complex technology-based industries.  
Accordingly, countries such as Nicaragua, which are squeezed at the low-end by wage 
competition from China and at the high-end by larger advanced economies, must 
carefully design and implement development strategies in order to maximize the use of 
scarce resources and capitalize on local advantages. 
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A significant challenge for smaller developing nations is located in external perceptions 
that include investment climate, market size, and country risk.  MNEs have a tendency to 
concentrate investments in these leading countries despite country risk indicators that 
suggest activities in some smaller countries will maintain or increase profits (Ul Haque et 
al., 2000)1. 
 
BPO services have a higher skill requirement for labor and developing nations are 
typically less endowed with managerial and organizational talent.  In nations where large 
percentages of the labor force may have been employed in protected industries, the labor 
force is less-trained and the instinct for quality workmanship is not “second nature” 
(Hirschman, 1967).  Therefore, in industrial tasks where there is wide latitude for poor 
performance, actual performance will usually be poor.  On the other hand, in tasks that 
require the most discipline, performance has been observed to be nearly equal to that of 
older industrial nations.  By equipping Nicaraguan workers with the skills to manage the 
complex processes and ICT in contact centers, the industry can have spillover effects on 
other potential technical industries through a general strengthening of the labor force.     
 
Despite the challenges described above, there is room for effective public interventions.  
Nations like Ireland, South Korea, Chile, and Costa Rica offer examples of various 
policies that have led to success in global trade and development.  All have invested 
heavily in education and human capital development, and pursued nuanced strategies for 
attracting foreign investment and cultivating domestic industries that can engage in 
global production chains.  In pursuing these interventions, governments of developing 
countries can learn from the experiences of others, but must also pursue strategies that 
best fit the characteristics of their own nation.   
 
                                                 
1 Nicaragua does not receive much attention from the media in OECD countries and is still combating the 
images of war and revolution from the 1980s.  Additionally, it faces challenges from weaknesses in its 
institutional system and corruption (Transparency International, 2006).  The justice system is inefficient 
and politicized, and reforms are needed to establish legal and institutional frameworks that promote 
transparency, the rule of law, and business and investor confidence.   
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Section 3:  Nicaragua and BPO Services 
 
There is a worldwide literature on the changing nature of the global economy and the 
effect of ICT advances, which are facilitating the transfer of activities from 
manufacturing to the services sector.  This renders the services, particularly business 
process services, more tradable (UNCTAD, 2006).  Nicaragua aspires to capitalize on the 
growing market for business services by establishing a contact center industry that can 
provide complex BPO services to foreign producers. 
 
Currently, Nicaragua is home to two small telemarketing centers, a healthcare customer 
support facility, an employee support center for the Spanish telecom company Telefónica, 
and the newest entrant, Press2, a Danish-Nicaraguan joint venture.  The estimated total 
employment of the five centers is near 600 people (Proctor, 2006), with average monthly 
wages for bi-lingual and Spanish speaking customer service representatives being lower 
than competing firms in other Central American nations (ProNicaragua, 2006).  To reach 
a stated goal of 4,000 employees by 2009 (Businessweek, January 30, 2006), Nicaragua 
will depend on the ability of these firms, and any subsequent entrants, to capitalize on 
nearshore outsourcing opportunities with U.S. companies, and increase their service 
quality and capacity.  Another important factor is Nicaragua’s ability to cultivate a skilled 
and capable labor force (to be discussed further in Section 7). 
 
The Changing Nature of Service Activities 
The potential for the global trade of services is immense.  In 2002, a WTO study revealed 
that services accounted for over 60 percent of global GDP, yet only 20 percent of world 
trade.  The proliferation of ICTs has expanded the range of tradable services and reduced 
the costs of service provision in distant locations (Papinniemi et al., 2005).  Furthermore, 
technology enables firms to disaggregate their value chains so that high skill activities 
such as research and development, supply chain management, and marketing remain at 
the corporate level, while intermediate functions and services can be delegated to outside 
providers to gain cost advantages (van Marrewijk et al., 1996).   
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Along with an aggregate increase in offshore activities, the type of activities moving 
offshore has diversified as well.  For firms beginning to engage in offshoring, the initial 
activities are typically modest knowledge work such as back-office support, customer 
service, and data entry.  As firms have gained confidence in offshore providers, the scope 
of services has progressed to more sophisticated tasks such as computer coding, 
insurance underwriting, claims processing, and medical transcription (Reich, 2005).  This 
is significant for Nicaraguan firms, as initial service contracts are likely to come from 
North American firms that are beginning to consider offshoring, rather than the largest 
MNEs with long-standing activities in other countries.  
 
Firm Choice in Offshoring 
Growth of the international trade in business services will depend on three main factors: 
supply – the capacity and quality of offshore service providers; demand growth – the 
adoption of offshoring by firms; and industry conduct – the actions taken by industry 
players (NASSCOM-McKinsey, 2005).   
 
Countries like Nicaragua must focus on supply side issues, on which they have greater 
control, so that they are viewed as viable locations for firms seeking offshore services.  
On the demand side there are different drivers of firm decisions, and Nicaraguan 
providers are primarily focused on meeting the concerns of U.S. firms. Table 1 presents 
the different factors which affect firm decisions, and demonstrates that conditions in 
Nicaragua will directly influence the choices of these firms.  It is crucial that Nicaraguan 
BPO service providers, policy makers, and intermediaries are cognizant of these factors 
and actively working to build confidence with potential investors.  One initial advantage 
is that Nicaraguan contact centers are enabled by the existence of fiber optic backbone 
networks, which have the capacity to transmit large amounts of data at high speeds, and 
are protected from failures by redundant design.  Nicaragua has access to three submarine 
fiber optic cable systems (Appendix 2), which can lower the cost of use by firms due to 
competition (P. Stern, 2006).   
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Table 1  – Offshoring Considerations of U.S. Firms 
Considerations Comments 
Primary Driver 
Cost Savings Costs are important, but product quality must be assured 
Secondary Drivers 
Performance Improvement Quality offshore services create growth opportunities in 
parent firms 
Personal Connection Many offshore relationships are initiated via an employee in 
the parent firm from a foreign country which breeds comfort 
with the service provider 
U.S. Presence Service providers with U.S. representation are more 
effective at building relationships with lead firms 
Critical mass of skilled technical professionals Service providers must have an adequate labor force 
Technical and Non-Technical Knowledge 
Project Management Skills and Quality Certification Providers must demonstrate management and 
communication skills that minimize obstacles to effective 
service 
Language and Culture Providers must be able to effectively communicate with 
clients and customers alike 
Western Business Savvy Lead firms are comfortable with providers that follow 
similar business practices and norms 
Domestic Conditions 
Intellectual Property Protection In absence of regulation, lead firms must create 
disincentives for violation of intellectual property rights 
Regulatory Environment Contracts must be enforced and corruption minimized 
Telecommunications Infrastructure Robust and high bandwidth connectivity facilitates smoother 
transactions and engenders confidence in lead firms 
Physical Infrastructure Many providers have generators to prevent work stoppages 
from power outages, which is added into the cost of service 
Exogenous Factors 
Time Zone Difference Extreme time differences limit communications between 
lead firms and providers, which offers an advantage to LAC 
providers working with U.S. firms 
Political Stability Lead firms do not want to risk work stoppages and will 
often diversify offshoring locations to hedge against 
political risk 
Summarizing Factor 
Country Image This is the FUD factor – fear, uncertainty, and doubt – 
which often stems from stereotypes that lead firms have 
about a given country 
Source:  adapted by the author from Lewin(2005), Coward(2003), and McKinsey Global Institute(2006) 
 
Contact Center Operations 
A customer contact center is a collection of resources providing an interface between a 
service provider and its customers. The classic contact center is a call center, containing a 
collection of service representatives (reps), or agents, who interact with customers over 
the telephone.  In a call center, the service reps are supported by elaborate ICT equipment, 
such as a private branch exchange (PBX), an interactive voice response (IVR) unit, an 
automatic call distributor (ACD), a personal computer (PC) and assorted databases (Whitt, 
2002). With proliferation of online transactions, contact between the service provider and 
its customers if often made via e-mail or the Internet instead of by telephone. Thus, the 
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general interface between a service provider and its customers is now often called a 
contact center. 
 
For the most part, Nicaraguan contact centers are currently provide services which 
involves telephone and email services that have implications for the skill requirements of 
labor.  When telephone is the primary form of contact between customers and the 
providers, there are two types of calls.  The first are outbound calls, where agents place 
calls to potential customers typically with the intention of selling a service to the 
individual.  These calls require rather basic skills, with sales training being of primary 
importance (Mandelbaum et al., 2001).  Currently in Nicaragua, the two telemarketing 
centers and Press2 (for the near-term) are primarily engaged in these activities.   
 
The second type of calls are inbound calls, which are made by the customer to the call 
center with the purpose of obtaining information, reporting a product problem, or asking 
for help.  Handling inbound calls is complex because there are often many types of calls 
which require different service skills such as knowledge of different languages, multiple 
promotions, different service options, and the ability to analyze problems.  Currently, the 
healthcare and employee support centers in Nicaragua are engaged in these more 
sophisticated activities. 
 
Advantages for Nicaraguan Contact Centers 
A significant advantage the Nicaraguan contact centers would like to exploit is their 
nearshore proximity to the U.S.  Nearshore outsourcing is the practice of getting services 
performed by people in neighboring countries rather than in your own country.  
Geographic proximity means:  travel and communications are easier and less expensive, 
there are likely to be at least some commonalities between the cultures, and people are 
more likely to speak the same language.  While labor costs of nearshore service providers 
to the U.S. may be higher than those for similar services in India2, there is an assumption 
that the proximity advantage can outweigh cost advantages in some cases (Trefler, 2005).  
                                                 
2 ProNicaragua estimates that average contact center wages in Nicaragua are 50 percent higher than those 
in India, 2006. 
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Indeed, various researchers have observed that vast time zone differences, while allowing 
for 24 hour project work, also breed a “friction of distance” that can impede effective 
collaboration between principals and agents (Rao, 2004). 
 
In Nicaragua, proximity lowers the time and costs of making site visits by clients.  For 
example, there are multiple daily flights from Managua to Miami, Houston, and Atlanta, 
with average travel times between 2.5 and 3 hours.  This can limit transactional costs for 
U.S. firms compared to those incurred with more distant service providers in India.  In 
terms of cultural similarities, ProNicaragua currently has a database of over 4,000 
English-speaking Nicaraguans3 with interest in working in the contact center industry, of 
which over 1,000 have previously lived in the U.S. 
 
Not of the least importance is the size of the Spanish-speaking population in the U.S., 
estimated to be greater than 40 million people with a potential buying power of $454 
billion (US Census Bureau, 2002).  Accordingly, language and culture commonality are 
distinct advantages for nearshore providers in LAC, and creates the potential of 
employing workers that only speak Spanish rather than strictly bi-lingual workers.  In fact, 
the name of the newest firm, Press2, is a nod to the common IVR function that instructs 
callers to “press #2” to speak with a customer representative that speaks Spanish.  A 
recent market study titled Call Center Outsourcing in Latin America and the Caribbean 
to 2008 estimates that 60 percent of calls from the U.S. to LAC call centers are in English, 
with 40 percent in Spanish (Datamonitor, 2004). 
 
There is, however, considerable regional competition for the same U.S. market.  The 
Datamonitor study estimates that Latin America will have 11,900 contact centers by 2008 
with a capacity for 730,000 agent positions (APs), with Mexico and Argentina being 
home to the largest concentration of centers.  Within Central America, many countries 
already have a head start on Nicaragua.  According to the Central American Call Center 
Report of 2007 (Zagada Institute), there are 35 centers in Costa Rica, with an estimated 
                                                 
3 ProNicaragua has created a website, www.nicasearch.com, where potential contact center employees 
register themselves and submit voluntary information on work history and language skills. 
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8,000 APs; 50 centers, with close to 10,000 APs in Panama; and El Salvador and 
Guatemala already have over 7000 Contact Center employees working in 14 Centers.  
Though the potential nearshore market with U.S. firms is large, Nicaraguan firms will 
have to provide a variety of services of consistently improving quality to capture 
significant share of this market. 
 
Variety in Service Provision 
There is a value chain in the BPO industry (UNCTAD, 2005) comprised of different tiers 
of service activities, with the ascending tiers representing increasing levels of activity 
complexity (Table 2).  Higher tier activities require greater process management by 
service providers and higher-skilled employees within the centers.  Currently, three of the 
five Nicaraguan contact centers are engaged in outbound telemarketing.  Almori S.A., the 
healthcare support center, provides customer relationship management services to 
healthcare providers in Texas.  Both of these activities are located within the first tier of 
the value chain, which is consistent with the premise that the advent Nicaraguan contact 
centers are an entry-level strategy for the trade of business services.   
 
Table 2  – The BPO Services Value Chain 
Tier 1: Contact Center Services Tier 2: Back-Office Services Tier 3:  IT Services 
Help desk Claims processing Software development 
Technical support/advice Accounts processing Application testing 
After-sales support Transaction processing Content development 
Employee inquiries Query management processing Engineering and design 
Claims inquiries Customer admin. processing Product optimization 
Customer support and advice HR and payroll processing Other high-end services 
Market research Data processing Regional headquarters 
Answering services IT outsourcing Architectural services 
Prospecting (telemarketing) Logistics processing Biotech and pharmaceutical R&D 
Information services Quality Assurance Radiology, X-ray 
Customer relationship mgmt (CRM) Supplier invoices Distance education 
Source:  UNCTAD 2005 
 
Service providers in many developing nations are trying to capture market share in Tier 1 
activities, following similar strategies as that of Nicaragua.  Observing the evolution of 
BPO services in places like India can offer models for industrial development and 
strategy, as well as examples of how firms can advance up the BPO value chain.  In India 
call center operations have become commoditized and leading offshore service providers 
seek contracts with more complex service provisions and higher profit margins.  Many 
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firms are actually refusing call center service contracts unless they are linked with 
services in higher tiers (Businessweek, January 30, 2006).  Some Indian firms have even 
offshored their expertise in the call center business by establishing facilities in Ireland, 
the Philippines, and Honduras.     
 
 Performance Improvement 
Nicaraguan contact centers share the goals of Indian firms to generate greater economic 
activity by offering more complex BPO services (Luxner, 2006).  Whether these goals 
are realized will depend on the ability of firms to upgrade their processes, skills, 
functions, and client sectors.  In developed countries, this type of upgrading often 
involves patterns of innovation.  In Latin America, upgrading in this context can be 
viewed as a pattern of learning, where firms adapt and incrementally improve rather than 
create knowledge and technology (Giuliani, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2003).  Rather 
than seek entry in markets where they have little experience and proven capacity, 
Nicaraguan firms should seek consistent and incremental performance improvement.  
Such an approach can provide internal learning opportunities for the industry and build 
the confidence of external investors.  
 
MNEs are naturally skeptical of new entrants in service markets and it is crucial for 
service providers to meet the expectations of these firms.  The problem that most MNEs 
face is that what is being outsourced is a small component of a larger system (Gereffi, 
1999). This creates a tension. On the one hand, an MNE would like a service provider to 
contribute ever-improving component services, as described above. On the other hand, 
correcting incompatibilities between interdependent components can be a drain on the 
MNE’s energies. The MNE can conserve its energies by tightly controlling the 
improvement process, but this may inadvertently stifle the service provider’s incentive to 
innovate (Trefler, 2005).  This is notable because it describes potential limits of 
Nicaraguan contact centers’ ability to increase the sophistication of their processes and 
services. 
 
Implications for Nicaraguan Contact Centers 
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It is necessary for the Nicaraguan firms to have strong information and communication 
links with factors of both demand and supply.  On the demand side, Nicaraguan contact 
centers must communicate effectively with producers and global buyers of services.  This 
can be cultivated at the firm level via global sales representatives and the establishment 
of remote offices in the U.S. that can work directly with buyers.  Such a strategy will help 
firms better meet buyer expectations and develop relationships that build confidence and 
trust across borders.  Nicaraguan firms can also leverage relationships with market 
intermediaries like ProNicaragua, which can provide market intelligence and 
communicate the attributes of individual firms to potential buyers.  
 
On the supply side, firms must seek to train and retain its labor force in order to enable 
consistent process improvements over the long-term.  Contact centers are known for 
having high employee turnover, and this impacts quality of service.  In India, for example, 
service quality complaints and consumer backlash have led some firms to cease doing 
business with Indian firms, and GE has sold its Indian operations altogether (Batt, et al, 
2005).  At this point, Nicaraguan firms can ill-afford a similarly negative experience with 
large global buyers, as the industry has an exponentially lower capacity to absorb the 
losses of major clients.  Similarly the firms need to work with education and training 
institutions to insure that the inflow of new labor possesses the skills necessary for 
increasing the scope and complexity of services.   This will involve developing formal 
institutions for communicating the demands of the market to the education and training 
sector.   
 
Framework for Contact Center Industry Growth 
Figure 1 proposes a conceptual framework for the dynamics of the industry growth in 
Nicaragua, and the relationship between global demand, industry action, and policy 
response.  This framework is designed utilizing causal loops, adapted from dynamic 
system modeling methods, to illustrate relationships between important variables in the 
“system” of the Nicaraguan contact center industry.  This framework does not propose to 
explain all the complexities of global integration; rather, the aim of this model is to bring 
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focus to the most important variables for Nicaraguan stakeholders to consider when 
pursuing strategies for entry into the global trade of BPO services. 
 
Figure 1 – Framework for the growth of the contact center industry in Nicaragua 
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Source:  Author  
 
Figure 1 shows a series of connected causal loops, with Nicaraguan contact centers (Nica 
Contact Centers) being at the center.  The interpretation of this framework is that a series 
of reinforcing loops (with an R in the center) are the drivers of growth for the industry.  
There is also one balancing loop, the “Global Competition Loop” (with a B in the center), 
which could counter the growth effects of the reinforcing loops.  In this framework 
“Global Competition” represents all other nations that are competing for market share in 
the international trade of BPO services. The simplified equation for successful growth of 
the contact center industry is that the effects of the reinforcing loops must outweigh those 
of the balancing loop.   
 
Whether these loops are positive or negative depends on the activities of the variables 
within them.  For example, the “Nica Labor Market Loop” would be interpreted as 
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follows.  Since there are already five contact centers in Nicaragua, their positive short-
term growth will increase “Labor Demand.”  This is signified by the polarity, or “+” sign 
on the link between the two variables.  An increase in “Labor Demand” will increase the 
need for “Post-Secondary Training,” while an increase in this training will increase the 
size of the “Skilled Labor Force.”  The more skilled the labor force, the greater the 
“Complexity of Service Offerings” will be, which will allow the “Nica Contact Centers” 
to grow further.   
 
While this description highlights the positive relationships, any negative outputs from the 
variables will have corresponding negative effects on the linked variables, thus making it 
a negative reinforcing loop.  For example, if education and training institutions do not 
respond to increases in labor demand, Nicaragua will not have a labor force of sufficient 
size or skill to increase industry competitiveness and the complexity of service offerings. 
 
Global trade is complex and difficult to capture with simple models, but this framework 
is a useful tool for understanding the dynamics at play in the case of Nicaragua and 
illustrates the key variables that will drive the growth of the contact center industry.  It is 
important to read between the lines and identify the necessary elements and 
intermediaries for reinforcing the links of the model.  For example, how will 
communication systems between industry, market intermediaries, and policy institutions 
be established?  The model also does not answer whether educational institutions, firms, 
and other training intermediaries will be able to augment the supply of skilled labor 
needed by the industry.  It is more appropriate to view this as a map, with the variables 
serving as guideposts for industrial development.    
 
 
Section 4:  Establishing a Contact Center in Nicaragua - The Case of Press2 
 
With the rapid expansion of the global market for business services and increased 
competition from other Latin American countries, the government of Nicaragua initiated 
in 2005 a proactive strategy to create the capacity to provide high-quality business 
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services within Nicaragua (Businessweek January 30, 2006).  In May of 2006, it 
commenced an investment of $3.8 million toward the development of a contact center 
facility in the Invercasa, a modern office building in Managua, with the explicit goal of 
attracting a first-order MNE with experience in global sourcing of services (MIFIC, 
2006).  The government hoped to build a BPO cluster around this MNE, much as Costa-
Rica has tried to do with INTEL and the electronics industry (Porter and Ketelhöhn, 
2002A).   
 
The government hired a Nicaraguan national, who had spent 32 years in the U.S. and 
helped build call centers in Australia, Europe, India, the Philippines, and South America, 
to lead the planning and help develop a strategy to attract a Fortune 100 company to 
anchor the cluster (MIFIC, 2006).  It wanted to emulate the success of the strategy of 
others, much like India attracted General Electric and American Express, so that other 
large firms would follow (Luxner, 2006).  While hiring a local expert in contact center 
design was effective for ensuring a “Class A” facility, it did not deliver a Fortune 100 
anchor firm as a client.  In the short-term, the inability to secure an investment from a 
large multinational was seen as a failure as the new facility sat idle.  However, failure can 
sometimes breed unexpected success in development projects.   
 
Albert Hirschman (1967) described the Principle of the Hiding Hand, which addresses 
the surprising nature of creativity.  Underlying the principle is the idea that people 
typically take on new tasks because of the presumed absence of challenge.  In the case of 
the Invercasa, it was assumed that the booming market for services and experience of the 
hired agent would lead to investment from a major MNE.  According to Hirschman, if the 
actual costs and difficulties of a project were known beforehand, it is likely that people 
would not initiate it in the first place.  When tasks are found to be more difficult than 
expected, however, the perseverance of people to engage the challenges can unleash 
creative forces that sometimes lead to success.  The void of MNE investment brought 
new parties to the project.  ProNicaragua facilitated the introduction of a domestic firm 
to a Danish firm with broad experience operating contact centers in Europe.   
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The unintended result of the initial project was the formation of the Press2 joint venture 
between Nicaraguan and Danish firms, and it has the potential to cultivate greater long-
term benefit for Nicaragua than if a multinational had used the Invercasa as a captive 
facility.  Contact center activities and technologies that are driven by MNE ownership 
have been observed to operate as enclaves, much like maquila operations in textiles 
(IADB, 2006).  By engaging local firms and workforce development institutions in 
industry development, the conditions are perhaps better suited for industrial 
agglomeration and cluster development than if a singular multinational had occupied the 
Invercasa facility and maintained the outward-focus of other foreign exporters in 
Nicaragua.  Whether Press2 is a successful catalyst of this type of growth will depend 
upon its ability to provide high quality service, and the ability of the local labor force to 
acquire the skills needed for these activities.  Additionally, it will require the recognition 
of its success by potential investors.   
 
Hirschman also points out that as much as costs can be underestimated, benefits can be 
overestimated.  The Invercasa investment represents a significant use of government 
resources that bear a great opportunity cost, and it is conceivable that the capacity of the 
facility will never be fully utilized.  The Press2 venture, however, is endowed with 
important factors to enable the success of the firm, and perhaps the industry at large.   
 
In terms of the facility, the government maintains full ownership and leases its use to 
Press2.  This serves to mitigate government costs and minimize the capital risks of Press2.  
It is equipped with state-of-art ICT infrastructure and the technical security systems 
necessary for providing services to global financial institutions, some of the most 
demanding and complex clients.  Currently, the firm is primarily engaged in 
telemarketing services, the first tier of BPO service complexity in Table 2.  Yet, it has the 
capacity and ambition to expand service offerings to the more complex activities in the 
third tier.  Whether the firm can grow to fulfill this potential depends on factors explored 
in this paper, including the attraction of high-quality FDI and the cultivation of a skilled 
labor force. 
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The bi-national ownership also enhances the venture.  The domestic principal is a 
conglomerate with investments in several local industries, an established national 
distribution network, and strong ties with other business and government leaders.  
Therefore, local ownership has the potential to facilitate stronger linkages between 
export-oriented activities and domestic firms.  The involvement of the Danish firm and its 
operational experience in the industry is a positive unintended consequence that could 
yield great benefits.  By partnering with a global firm with a proven track record in 
securing clients and growing its BPO services business, Press2 may be better suited for 
commercial success than the original agent who possessed experience primarily in design 
and infrastructure development.   
 
The presence of the Danish firm in the venture is also bringing additional resources from 
the Danish government development fund, IFU, to assist with workforce development 
and training in Nicaragua.  IFU has contracted with a Danish business college, Vejle 
Business College, to provide immediate training to Press2 employees, and to develop a 
proposal for a permanent training academy in Nicaragua which could serve multiple 
firms in the Nicaraguan BPO industry (Section 7 will discuss the potential training center 
in more detail).  The goal of the IFU is to share its expertise in workforce development 
and empower local actors to take ownership of the training academy so that it will be 
better suited to meet local needs and characteristics.  Training is expensive, and such a 
center will help the small Nicaraguan firms minimize the fixed costs required for in-
house training. IFU is committed to multi-year funding for the academy’s development, 
but long-term success will depend on its ability to cultivate local staff and clients.       
 
In summary, the Press2 partnership may yield greater long-term benefits to Nicaragua 
than if a multinational had invested first because it has involved parties and institutions 
that share an interest in long-term industry growth rather than the short-term profit 
maximization or cost savings of a single firm.  Leaders of policy, industry, and 
intermediaries like ProNicaragua recognize the importance of developing an industry 
rather than a single firm.  The industry needs to grow and generate the labor demand and 
competitive dynamics exhibited in Figure 1 if Press2 and its peer firms are to be 
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successful.  A large, competitive industry can positively influence the quality of service 
provision, attract the attention of a larger pool of potential investors, and stimulate 
demand for labor that can influence the activities and decisions labor market 
intermediaries like education and training institutions.  
 
 
Section 5:  The Role of Policy in Cultivating the Industry 
 
Public policy has an important role in enabling the success of the Nicaraguan contact 
center industry and increasing the nation’s participation in the knowledge economy.  In 
such an economy, cheap labor and exports of primary commodities are insufficient to 
enable rising living standards. Ascending the value chain depends on managing the 
adaptation and diffusion of new technologies (Sachs, 2002). Free markets alone may not 
give the right signals for investment in new technologies, especially when there are high 
and unpredictable learning costs (Kim and Lee, 1999). Moreover, firms in developing 
countries face structural disadvantages such as lack of information, weak capital markets, 
and inadequate support institutions (UNDP, 2006).  Government plays a role by creating 
macro- and micro-economic conditions conducive to the enabling of knowledge economy 
activities, and by identifying externality-generating innovations (Stiglitz, 1999).  While 
Nicaragua has already prioritized policies to increase FDI and export activities, the 
contact center industry has helped emphasize the importance of sound investments in 
technology, as evidenced by the development of the Invercasa facility.     
 
Increasing the inflow of FDI is frequently discussed as an important driver of growth in 
developing countries (Borensztein, 1998).  There are, however, debates about the impacts 
of different types of FDI, and these impacts depend upon a combination of a nation’s 
policies and characteristics (Willem te Velde, 2001).  Indeed, FDI has been vital for the 
economic growth of countries like Ireland, Costa Rica, and the Asian “Tigers.”  These 
leading small developing countries have employed effective long-term strategies for 
increasing FDI flows to export-oriented industries.  In its 1999 Agenda for Nicaraguan 
Competitiveness, INCAE’s Latin American Center for Competitiveness and Sustainable 
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Development (CLACDS) identified South Korea and Ireland as benchmarks for 
developing a policy strategy.  Both nations share similarities in that their development 
has been buoyed by long-term strategies for human capital formation, an export-
orientation, and consistent policies that transcended political turnovers.  For many 
reasons, the developing nations of Latin America are trailing these leading nations in 
terms of development (Rios-Morales and O’Donovan, 2006).  Nicaragua can look to 
them for examples of how sound policy and long-term government strategies have served 
to attract high-quality FDI. 
 
Sound macroeconomic policy is an important foundation for enabling trade activities, as 
the development of financial markets encourages MNEs to offshore services (Vietor, 
2007).  A significant accomplishment of the Nicaraguan government was to rein in the 
hyperinflation that began in 1988, bringing it down to 10 percent by the end of the 1990s 
and to 5 percent in 2001 (IADB, 2003).  In terms of monetary policy, the Nicaraguan 
Central Bank (BCN) has established a crawling peg for the Nicaraguan Cordoba to the 
U.S. Dollar, which maintains a five percent nominal rate of depreciation (BCN, 2007).  
While this policy has slightly undervalued the Cordoba, this has the effect of creating 
value (exchange income) for U.S. firms that would like to use Nicaragua as an export 
platform since they are allowed to repatriate profits in dollars (CNZF, 1991).  
Additionally, by maintaining a close association with the U.S. Dollar, the Nicaraguan 
economy and the Cordoba are less susceptible to shocks that might occur with other 
currencies when the Dollar becomes volatile.  
 
Incentives for Investment 
Nicaragua also offers an example of how small developing countries use incentives to 
compete for FDI (Barros and Cabral, 2000).  There is a downside to competing purely on 
supply-side incentives alone, as countries with similar characteristics are likely to 
increase the costs of said incentives.  Governments must also tend to the demand-side, 
and pursue strategies that enhance the local business environment and increase its 
bargaining power with MNEs (Tendler, 2000).  The investment of the Nicaraguan 
government in the Press2 facility is one example of a demand-side strategy to attract FDI.  
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By assuming the cost of infrastructure, the Nicaraguan government facilitated additional 
investment by Press2 and the Danish government.   
 
Supply-side financial incentives, however, are important in terms of continued industry 
growth.  Government must carefully select different policy instruments that assist 
exporters with credit, risk management, and working capital by offsetting taxes and 
duties (Agosin and Ffrench-Davis, 1995).  Nicaragua does not have an institution solely 
dedicated to export finance, but there are vehicles that can benefit potential foreign 
investors in the contact center industry as well as local firms that can serve as suppliers.  
Exporters can receive some short-term support from the National Investment Finance 
Company (FNI).  Additionally, U.S. firms operating in Nicaragua are eligible for export 
insurance from the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (Conroy, 1998).  
USAID has established a $20 million fund for local SME suppliers of exporters (USAID, 
2006).  This serves the dual purpose of assisting local firms with working capital and 
attempting to strengthen backward linkages from the exporters to the local market.  
Currently, however, there is no indication that these funds are supporting suppliers to 
contact centers. 
 
Export Processing Zones 
EPZs are the most widely used export promotion policy in LAC countries (Mello, 2001) 
and provide a vehicle for Nicaraguan contact centers to receive the designation of stand-
alone EPZ.  They have proven their effectiveness for increasing exports in a host nation, 
but are not a singular solution for effective global integration.  By their nature, EPZs 
segment economic activities within a nation, and governments must also have inward-
looking policies to complement the outward-looking focus of EPZs (Madani, 1999).  It 
will be important for Nicaraguan contact centers to determine whether EPZ status will 
limit their ability to operate in domestic markets and with local suppliers.   
 
The Nicaraguan contact center industry can take advantage of the opportunities provided 
by EPZs for the acquisition of superior technology, upgrading of labor and managerial 
skills, and greater access to foreign markets (Jenkins, Esquivel, and Larrain, 1998).  
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While textiles and apparel industries generally involve lower-skilled production 
processes, trade in BPO services presents an opportunity to simultaneously upgrade the 
skills of workers and for Nicaraguan firms to ascend the value chain in the global trade of 
business services.  Countries like Ireland, which have focused on high-value added export 
activities, have proven this potential by leveraging export promotion for the development 
of domestic industries (Haider, 2005). 
 
Research shows that the establishment of EPZs is more likely to improve the host nation's 
welfare when two conditions exist: 1) when there are relatively large rates of 
unemployment; and 2) when EPZ firms form strong backward linkages with 
intermediate-producing local firms (Jenkins, Esquivel, and Larrain, 1998).  With respect 
to backward linkages, however, the current manufacturing activities in Nicaraguan EPZs 
have not demonstrated strong linkages to local suppliers and markets (Willman, 2001).  
South Korea and Taiwan offer examples of effective policy for developing backward 
linkages, by carefully selecting industries for EPZs which complemented domestic 
knowledge-based growth strategies and by providing for limited domestic distribution of 
EPZ goods (Yuan and Eden, 1992).   
 
The emergence of the contact center industry in Nicaragua and the presence of local 
ownership in all existing firms may help to change this dynamic.  Whether the Comisión 
Nacional de Zonas Francas (CNZF) is the most effective policy regime for this industry 
remains to be seen.  The most established contact center in Nicaragua, Almori S.A., has 
intentionally avoided government subsidies and support, with its principal stating that, 
“we cannot live off the government.”  Almori provides back office services to a 
pharmacy operation in Texas owned by the same principal and has aligned the scale of its 
business with that of its U.S. parent (Luxner, 2006).  In this sense it is unique compared 
to the other firms that are seeking to provide customized services for a broad range of 
clients.  By seeking opportunities in a larger number of production chains, the 
requirements of these firms very well could create opportunities for local firms to partner 
with them as suppliers and contractors. 
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Nicaragua may want to explore the possibility of developing an intermediary to focus on 
linking local firms and suppliers with BPO and other knowledge economy firms.  Ireland 
created Enterprise Ireland to provide professional services to local firms in order to 
improve productivity and meet the quality standards of international markets (Rios-
Morales and O’Donovan, 2006).  Currently, Nicaragua has a government sponsored 
agency called the Nicaraguan Institute for the support of SMEs (INPYME).  With almost 
90 percent of the labor force located in firms with less than 100 employees, it would be a 
logical institution for facilitating backward linkages.  While the goals of INPYME are 
clearly focused on improving productivity and innovation within SMEs, its strategic plan 
for 2001-05 does not have any mention of linkages to exporters or accessing international 
markets (INPYME, 2001).  While it is certain that Nicaraguan SMEs are seeking export 
opportunities on their own, a more formal role for INPYME, or a new intermediary, may 
enable stronger links with BPO firms. 
 
 
Section 6:  ProNicaragua as Market Advocate for Contact Centers 
 
In 2002, the government established ProNicaragua as the Nicaraguan Investment 
Promotion Agency (IPA).  It is incorporated as a non-profit, public-private institution, 
with a mission to generate economic growth and job creation by attracting “high-quality” 
foreign investment.  There are two important functions of an IPA (Wells and Wint 2001).  
The first consists of its role in communicating and disseminating information to external 
parties, something that is crucial for overcoming market failures.  The second is that an 
IPA can play a role in coordinating most activities aimed at improving the business 
environment in the host country.  
 
 IPAs provide a variety of services that typically include image building, investment 
generation, investor services, and policy advocacy (See Appendix 3).  Representatives of 
ProNicaragua engage in the services described above and serve a broad range of industry 
sectors which are listed in Table 3.  The agency also engages in the research and 
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investigation of investment diagnostics in all regions of Nicaragua.  In this capacity it 
serves as something akin to an internal think tank.    
 
While their organizational forms vary between government agencies, public-private 
partnerships and NGOs, they are viewed as useful instruments for overcoming the 
information asymmetries that vex many developing countries (Morisset and Andrews-
Johnson, 2004).  One successful example is Ireland’s Industrial Development Agency 
(IDA), which is credited with bringing “tigerhood” to Ireland (Battel, 2003).  Another is 
the Costa Rican Coalition of Development Initiatives (CINDE), which is credited for 
attracting INTEL and helping develop an electronics manufacturing cluster (Rodriguez-
Clare, 2001).  While IPAs have demonstrated success in attracting investment that might 
not otherwise occur, their effectiveness is limited by the environment of the countries 
they operate in.  Regardless of the polish an IPA may provide, a country with a poor 
investment climate will have a difficult time attracting investments.      
 
Based on observations of other countries, the Nicaraguan government wanted to ensure 
the presence of a world-class investment promotion agency over the long term.  
Accordingly, ProNicaragua has been staffed by a specialized professional team with 
extensive experience in the international private sector, and its organizational structure 
has the profile of a small and efficient private agency (Bolaños NDP, 2003). 
ProNicaragua also coordinates efforts with other institutions that promote trade and 
development like CNZF and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MFIC).  
ProNicaragua is also designed to focus on value-added export activities, while 
NICAEXPORT is a government sponsored agency that focuses on more traditional 
exporting of agricultural commodities and artisan products (NICAEXPORT, 2007).   
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Table 3 – Sector Focus of ProNicaragua and Number of Employees 
Function  Number of Staff 
Senior Management 3 
MCA Regional Manager 1 
Market Intelligence Research 3 
Public Relations 1 
Legal Counsel 1 
Administrative Support 3 
Investment Advisors by Sector 
Tourism 2 
Contact Centers and BPO 1 
Medical Devices and Electronic Assembly 1 
Textiles and Apparel 2 
Agribusiness (and Food Processing) 1 
Totals  
5 Sectors 19 
Source:  www.ProNicaragua.org 
 
In the pursuit of FDI, it is the nature of IPAs to be opportunistic and flexible in order to 
be able to respond to new opportunities.  In addition to the sectors listed in Table 7, 
ProNicaragua has increased advisory services in the retail and telecommunications sector 
in response to more recent interest from foreign firms.  With a relatively small staff, such 
a broad sectoral focus could limit down-stream effectiveness by cultivating a broad rather 
than deep expertise in desirable sectors.  The experience of older IPAs has shown the 
benefits of depth of sectoral expertise and specialization, as well as staff capacity to 
provide quality service (Moirsset, 2004).  IPAs must find an appropriate balance between 
proactive and reactive investment promotion, and be able to cultivate the expertise and 
relationships necessary to target specific sectors.  The current lean structure of 
ProNicaragua could inhibit this ability in the long-term as it will not be able to be all 
things to all parties. 
 
ProNicaragua can learn from the case of CINDE and how it realigned its strategic focus 
to pursue higher value-added activities and ensure it had the depth of expertise needed for 
effective industrial targeting.  CINDE is a private non-profit founded in 1983.  For its 
first ten years, it worked primarily to attract FDI in agriculture and unskilled 
manufacturing industries.  During the development a new strategic plan in 1993, CINDE 
realized that Costa Rica was losing competitiveness in these industries as the advent of 
NAFTA was diverting FDI for these activities to Mexico (Rodriguez-Clare, 2001).  
CINDE decided to focus on fewer sectors and to redirect its attention toward the 
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electronic and telecommunications industries.  By 1995, CINDE succeeded in helping 
attract four different electronics manufacturers to Costa Rica, which allowed it to 
improve its understanding of the needs of firms in the sector.  When CINDE learned that 
INTEL was searching for a location for a new $2 billion Assembly and Testing plant, it 
formulated an approach.  Though Costa Rica was not initially on INTEL’s list of 
potential locations, CINDE’s proactive marketing and industry knowledge impressed the 
INTEL search team and enabled the negotiations which brought the INTEL plant to 
Costa Rica (Porter and Ketelhön, 2002A).   
 
Research and interviews conducted by Debora Spar (1998) for the Foreign Investment 
Advisory Service (FIAS) revealed four factors that influenced INTEL’s decision: 1) the 
general country characteristics of Costa Rica; 2) Costa Rica’s growing emphasis and 
success in attracting high tech FDI; 3) the existence of an effective and knowledgeable 
IPA like CINDE; and 4) a government that understood the importance of an INTEL 
investment in the country and motivated its agencies to help Intel as much as they could 
within the limits of existing laws and regulations.  These findings demonstrate how and 
IPA can build momentum and expertise such that one success can lead to another.   
 
Ireland’s approach to investment promotion serves as an even more mature and 
comprehensive example for ProNicaragua.  Founded in 1969 as an autonomous state-
sponsored body, the Industrial Development Agency (IDA) was responsible for all 
aspects of industrial development with regard to export-oriented enterprise in Ireland.  
Like CINDE, the IDA evolved over time from establishing Ireland’s modern 
manufacturing base to targeting high-technology and high-output industries and 
expanding into internationally traded service sectors (Haider, 2005).  IDA targets over 
time have included manufacturing sectors in the 1970s, then computer, pharmaceutical, 
and healthcare in the 1980s to early 1990s.  More recently, the IDA has targeted 
international financial and business services industries and Internet services.   
 
Different from CINDE, the IDA has an expansive infrastructure due to its substantial 
government funding.  Beside the headquarters in Dublin, the IDA has 11 regional offices 
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and 13 global offices which employ 240 specialists, and enable it to work closely with the 
firms and industries it targets (www.idaireland.com, 2007).  This structure, however, is 
not inexpensive.  The average cost per job created from 1996-2002 was €15,897 (Rios-
Morales and O’Donovan, 2006).  There is a substantial body of literature that debates the 
costs of economic development programs and job creation, and there is clearly a trade-off 
Nicaragua must account for when committing public funds to investment promotion 
activities and incentives for firms. 
 
Enterprise Ireland, is the domestic-focused counterpart to IDA, with a mission to create 
and grow Irish enterprises as suppliers to and partners with foreign-based firms.  It 
promotes business start-ups and expansion based on the need of foreign-based firms for 
local supply chains and exchanges with Irish-based businesses (Haider, 2005).  To aid 
this strategy, Enterprise Ireland facilitates relationships with firms and financing sources 
like angel investors, venture capital, and banks (www.enterprise-ireland.com, 2007).  
Like the IDA, Enterprise Ireland has a large organizational structure with 13 domestic 
offices and 33 global offices.  At the global level, Enterprise Ireland handles business 
investment marketing functions and helps facilitate joint ventures and distribution and 
marketing agreements for Irish and foreign firms.   
 
In sum, Nicaragua can learn from the experiences of others, and create specialized 
intermediaries that coordinate activities in an effective manner to meet national 
development goals.   At this point, however, the Irish model is too large and costly for the 
current state of affairs in Nicaragua; however, there are some important lessons from the 
experience of Ireland.  While ProNicaragua can serve the current needs of Nicaragua it 
must balance its resources between proactive and reactive opportunities.  As 
ProNicaragua grows it should consider the potential of developing a counterpart agency 
much like Enterprise Ireland.  Current counterparts like INPYME are inward-focused, 
but do not have specific strategies for integrating Nicaraguan firms into export-oriented 
industries.  At some point, there will be a need to diversify the functions of researching 
investment opportunities, attracting FDI, and creating backward linkages with local firms.  
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Additionally, ProNicaragua might consider locating a permanent representative in the 
U.S. to build closer relationships with potential offhsoring clients. 
 
 
Section 7:  Human Capital Formation 
 
For the Nicaraguan contact center industry, the supply of a skilled and capable labor 
force is crucial.  Contact centers must be able to draw from a pool of workers with 
sufficient breadth and depth of skills if they want to increase the scope and complexity of 
services provided.  Nicaragua has great potential in the realm of human capital.  Its 
population is very young; the 2000 census reporting that over 78 percent of the 
population is younger than 35 years (CEPAL, 2005).  The national university system 
contains 44 schools with a combined enrollment greater than 95,000 (ProNicaragua, 
2006).  Managua is also the location of INCAE, the Central American Business School, 
which was founded under the technical supervision of Harvard Business School (HBS). 
There is also a concentration of bilingual education centers in Managua, with one English 
language university, three English language university degree programs, and five bi-
lingual high schools.  These conditions suggest that Nicaragua has a base upon which it 
can support the development of the contact center industry and other knowledge-based 
industries. 
 
Developing human capital involves two distinct processes: (1) skill development through 
formal education, and (2) training and capability formation through specific technology-
based experience (Lall, 1999).  The former can be provided by intermediaries like the 
basic and post-secondary education system.  The latter process may be facilitated by third 
party technical schools and certificate programs, or by BPO service firms themselves in 
what is known as enterprise training.  Migration is another factor that influences the 
composition of the Nicaraguan BPO labor force, and the potential benefit of the 
Sandinista era diaspora to provide a near-term foundation of skilled bi-lingual workers.  
 
 - 32 -
The introduction of BPO services to the Nicaraguan economy represents the potential for 
significant technological change in the local economy.  Inflows of FDI increase the 
probability of having a technological change, which can offer higher returns to human 
capital investment.  The use of information technology is pervasive in new work methods 
that accompany FDI such as process control, total quality management, and just-in-time 
inventory systems.  All of these necessitate higher skill levels and training efforts, with 
the intensity of skill upgrading rising with the complexity and sophistication of the 
technologies involved.  In addition, the increased importance of networking between 
firms and other institutions requires specific ‘communicative’ skills (Tomlinson, 1999).  
Knowledge-intensive sectors are the most dynamic in industry with respect to their 
learning potential, so that employees who can enter them benefit from a virtuous cycle of 
skill creation and upgrading. 
  
Additionally, increasing BPO service activities with MNEs can have an impact on 
knowledge diffusion within Nicaraguan institutions.  In small developing nations, MNEs 
can function like educational institutions by transferring knowledge (e.g., technical 
expertise, management techniques, job skills, production methods) to local institutions 
(e.g., domestic industry, universities, public schools, R&D centers) that can move a 
country up the learning and development curves (IADB, 2006).  However, the local 
acquisition of knowledge is not automatic.  MNEs transfer the technologies suited to 
existing capabilities in local economies.  Where skills, supplier capabilities, and technical 
knowledge are low, they import simple labor-intensive technologies and create the 
capabilities to use these efficiently.  They do not invest in creating more advanced 
capabilities that need more sophisticated skills, or transfer advanced functions that are 
efficiently centralized elsewhere.  Only the government can upgrade the skill creation 
system or boost supplier capabilities (Lall, 1999).  Nicaraguan development policy in the 
context of human capital formation, therefore, must seek to cultivate knowledge and 
transfer skills to industry to avoid the marginalization of the labor force.          
 
 
 
 - 33 -
The Importance of Basic Education 
Nicaragua is a country with a relatively small population, and the average education 
attainment of less than 5 years cannot help but weigh heavily against the potential future 
growth of the BPO services industry.  New forms of work organization require greater 
responsibility and greater skills from the workforce, and low literacy rates in developing 
countries impede growth in new industries.  Though considerable progress can be made 
with a poorly educated labor force, particularly in early stages of integration, firms which 
have educated labor are likely in the long run to make more progress in their training 
schemes (ILO: World Employment Report, 1999). This is because the requirements of a 
skilled workforce, and worker participation in continuous improvement, call for an 
understanding of the underlying technical processes. 
 
Though basic education is not the focus of this paper, or a significant factor for the near-
term success of workers in the contact center industry, it has important long-term 
implications for Nicaragua’s ability to engage in knowledge economy activities.  The 
need to develop a population with basic skills and literacy is indeed something that has 
implications for the entire economy, and increasing the flow of students into secondary 
and post-secondary education institutions is vital for ensuring the existence of a labor 
force with the capability to meet global production standards. 
 
Post Secondary Education and Training Institutions 
Fluid relationships between academia and industry are commonly described as being 
critical for transferring knowledge and technical gains, particularly in the realm of 
innovation.  These same relationships are also vital for the development of human capital 
in medium-tech industries like BPO services (IADB, 2006).  Despite challenges at the 
basic levels of education, Nicaragua does have a relatively large supply of students 
enrolled in post-secondary (or tertiary) education institutions.  The national university 
system in Nicaragua contains 44 schools with a combined enrollment greater than 95,000 
(ProNicaragua, 2007).  This represents 1.73 percent of the population, a significant 
increase from the 0.86 percent reported in 1997 (UNESCO – See Appendix 4).  This 
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speaks to both the youth of the population and improvements in Nicaraguan school 
enrollments since 1990.   
 
Within Managua, the location of all the current contact centers, there are four major 
institutions that could supply human capital to the BPO services and other knowledge 
economy industries.  Two of the universities are public, one receives partial public 
funding, and the other is private.   
 
The public universities tend to offer a broad range of academic disciplines and technical 
degrees.  The National University of Engineering (UNI) provides both undergraduate and 
master degrees in a variety of disciplines including: human resources, marketing, finance, 
project development and evaluation, management systems, and quantitative management 
methods (UNI, 2007).  The National Autonomous University (UNAN) is primarily a 
technical institution with departments of computer science, mathematics and statistics, 
physics, chemistry, and biology (UNAN, 2007).   
 
The Central American University (UCA) receives partial public funding.  It offers 
degrees in systems engineering, information technology, financial management, 
operations and logistics, as well as a program for teaching English as a second language 
(UCA, 2007).  UCA is also home to one of Nicaragua’s few biotechnology laboratories.  
Although Nicaraguan institutions do not grant doctorate degrees in science, UCA offers 
master programs in scientific research directed by some professors who have received 
scientific doctorates in the U.S. and Europe.   
 
The American University of Managua (UAM) is a private institution that was founded to 
develop professionals with the capability to meet the challenges of globalization and 
social and economic development needs of Nicaragua.  Its services may be more 
immediately applicable to the contact center industry, with course offerings in business 
administration, marketing, and systems and industrial engineering.  In addition, it offers 
several competencies (certificate programs) in the use of different information 
technologies, including training in Oracle, Microsoft and Novell network and database 
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management (UAM, 2007).  The former director of the Nicaraguan Advisory on Science 
and Technology (CONYCIT) is also an instructor at UAM and stated that the school is 
very responsive to market demand.  If an industry demonstrates a need for a particular 
technical skill, UAM is interested in developing a competency to meet that need.  
 
Beyond the four institutions above, Managua is also the location of INCAE, the Central 
American Business School.  INCAE now has a sister campus in Costa Rica, and is the 
largest source for advanced management education in Central America, with about 14 
percent of its students being from Nicaragua (INCAE, 2007).  INCAE also host the 
CLACDS project on regional competitiveness and engages in various collaborations with 
local industry to promote business and economic development. 
 
Currently, however, there is no formal linkage between the Nicaraguan BPO firms and 
local universities.  Informal links exist, such as the movement of the former Director of 
CONYCIT to UAM, but more intentional links have proven successful in other countries 
(IADB, 2006).  A starting point might be the formation of an industry association for 
BPO providers.  There are informal social relationships between many of the local 
investors, but there is no formal association for identifying industry needs and 
communicating them to government and education institutions.  An agency like 
ProNicaragua could also help facilitate more direct communication between industry and 
education so that appropriate training and skills can be incorporated into degree and 
certificate programs.    
 
Enterprise and Third-Party Training 
Training provided to workers after formal schooling is one of the most important sources 
of skill formation (Lall, 1999).  This training can take place in vocational institutions, 
within firms themselves, a practice known as enterprise training.  In the case of the BPO 
industry, the Danish IFU is developing the concept for training center to serve the 
specific needs of the industry. 
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Nicaragua has a government sponsored training center called INATEC.  An examination 
of its course catalog reveals that it primarily provides training for low-skilled jobs in EPZ 
industries, as well as administrative functions in different businesses.  The highest level 
of training it offers is equivalent to a high school diploma.  While INATEC is not likely 
to be a primary provider of labor for the contact centers in the near-term, it does offer 
training courses for bi-lingual executive secretaries (INATEC Course Catalog, 2007).  
Such courses create the possibility of training people for BPO functions such as 
telemarketing, which may be a viable option if firms are able to pursue more complex 
activities and need to promote higher-skilled workers to new functions and recruit entry-
level workers to take their place.  
 
Enterprise training can be an effective and economical way to develop the skills of the 
workforce.  Employers tend to be knowledgeable about skill needs, though they may not 
be aware of training methods.  Some, however, have the expertise to train people in 
traditional and emerging skills.  Enterprise training can also be cost-effective if executed 
well.  On one hand, there are costs in materials, time, foregone production, and the risk of 
employees leaving after training.  On the other hand, such training is also specific to 
employer needs and minimizes the risks of providing unnecessary or inappropriate skills 
(Tan and Batra, 1996).  To insure that benefits outweigh costs, firms must have the 
capacity to provide proper training. 
 
The most important determinants of worker training are (Lall, 1999):   
• The educational attainment of the workforce (educated workers are better learners 
and benefit more from training). 
• Firm size, as large firms can spread the fixed costs of training across a large pool 
of workers.  SMEs can be limited by poor information and inability to exploit 
scale economies in training. 
• The training and management capabilities of employers, which tend to be weaker 
in small firms. 
• The presence of external training institutions able to deliver relevant training at a 
low cost. 
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Currently, there is no a third-party training option for BPO services in Nicaragua.  Press2 
is leveraging its relationship with its Danish partner to mitigate the risks to small firms 
described above, with the Danish government development fund (IFU) funding a Danish 
business college, Vejle Business College, to provide the initial training to its employees.  
This serves to transfer knowledge gained in contact center operations in Europe to 
Nicaraguan managers, and also enables the college to use Press2 as a test for exploring 
the potential of a more comprehensive training academy.   
 
Contact center operations tend to be very specific, particularly for the less complex 
functions like telemarketing.  The current training regime at Press2 involves general 
agent training in company operations, sales theory and techniques, teamwork theory and 
techniques, and customer care.  There are also specialized training modules for 
supervisors with a focus on managing and monitoring agents (Christiansen and Beyer-
Pedersen, 2007).  The goal of this initial round of training is to endow Press2 with the 
ability to effectively conduct introductory training for new agents.  Currently, the 
business college and IFU are exploring the possibility of establishing an independent 
training center that can serve all firms in the industry with both basic and more complex 
training curricula.   
 
Nicaraguan stakeholders should not let the efforts of IFU exist in isolation, and 
involvement in design and development should extend to other parties outside of Press2.  
As contact centers advance up the BPO value chain, the need for enterprise training could 
intensify, as it is an essential complement to new investment in technology and new 
organizational methods (Lall, 1999).  Studies in mature industrial economies have shown 
that a shortage of appropriate worker skills is a major constraint on the adoption of new 
technologies (Bartel and Licthenberg, 1987); whereas well-trained workers accelerate this 
adoption.  This agrees with the value of the depth of human capital introduced at the 
beginning of this section.  
 
Enterprise training could also represent valuable organizational development for the firms 
in terms of testing one’s ability to adopt new ideas and upgrade skills and processes 
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internally.  This capacity will be necessary for advancing up the value chain, since the 
indigenous firms cannot count on a MNE for investment and knowledge diffusion.  
Ireland started its economic growth with call centers, and Irish policymakers recognized 
that they had to ascend the technology ladder within five years before they would start to 
lose their relative advantage due to entry from firms in other countries with low labor 
costs.  Consequently, they learned how to build the call center infrastructure equipment, 
and then transformed those skills into designing the software that runs the call center 
(IADB, 2006).    
 
Section 8:  Conclusion 
 
Contemporary global integration since 1980 has spurred a wave of free trade and export 
oriented policies in developing nations.  While an elite group of developing nations has 
realized the benefits of trade, many small nations lag behind and face tremendous 
pressures from international competition and domestic poverty. The large demand for 
offshore service provision is creating opportunities for small developing nations to 
increase participation in trade and knowledge economy activities, and Nicaragua’s 
nascent contact center industry serves as an example of how the selective use of resources 
and policy can yield benefits, even if they do not meet original expectations. 
 
The opportunity for Nicaragua to enter the global trade in BPO services is clear, and it 
has the potential to build relationships with multinational firms operating in the lucrative 
U.S. market.  By investing in the development of part of the Invercasa facility (a modern 
Managua office building) as a contact center, the government initiated a process which is 
leading toward unexpected positive results in the form of the Press2 venture and an 
extended relationship with the Danish government for training and workforce 
development.  The ultimate success of this investment may be the growth of a thriving 
domestic industry with a high ratio of local participation, rather than an enclave for 
multinational production chains. 
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Firms in the Nicaraguan contact center industry must strive to ensure quality service 
provision, and seek consistent improvement to advance to the upper levels of the BPO 
value chain.  The current group of five firms seems to be focused on cultivating the 
capabilities of workers and management, without exceeding their existing capacity to 
provide complex services.  However, the growth of this industry will depend upon the 
creation of a competitive environment which enables quality improvement, skill 
upgrading, and knowledge spillovers amongst firms.  If successful, the growth of the 
contact center industry can lead to the generation of other technology-based industries 
and create high-quality employment opportunities for Nicaragua’s young population.   
 
Beyond the firms, there are other institutions and intermediaries that play an important 
role in the development of this industry.  Government policy is crucial for ensuring a 
healthy climate for FDI and properly aligning programs and incentives to encourage 
export activities and backward linkages with local firms.  Market intermediaries like 
ProNicaragua add value by helping the Nicaraguan firms overcome information 
asymmetries and strategically target industry sectors.  Investment in human capital 
formation is required to ensure a sizeable and skilled labor force for contact centers and 
other knowledge based industries.  More specific recommendations are listed below. 
     
With regard to government policy, Nicaragua must continue working to maintain 
macroeconomic stability.  During this time of political transition, it is important to 
maintain the confidence of both foreign and domestic investors.  In terms of trade policy, 
the government needs to seek interventions that encourage more backward linkages with 
local firms.  The current EPZ system isolates a majority of export activity from the 
domestic economy, and locally-owned contact centers offer an opportunity for the 
diffusion of economic benefits to more local firms.  The spillover effects can also aid the 
development of other knowledge-based industries. 
 
ProNicaragua should continue to build its sectoral expertise in BPO services and help 
facilitate communication between Nicaraguan firms, global buyers, and domestic 
institutions that can aid in workforce development.  Currently, it must serve a broad range 
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of industries in Nicaragua and be opportunistic in pursuing FDI.  In the long-term, it can 
learn from the examples of Costa Rica and Ireland and sharpen its strategic focus on 
high-value added industries.  A counterpart agency, similar to Enterprise Ireland, should 
be considered.  It would focus on assisting local firms develop the capacity to participate 
in knowledge-economy trade activities and serve as suppliers to MNEs using Nicaragua 
as an export platform.   
 
Most importantly, the contact center industry must have access to a skilled and capable 
labor force.  There is a continued need for top-to-bottom improvement in the public 
education system and technical education should be emphasized at early stages in the 
curriculum to increase the downstream supply of technically skilled citizens.  At the 
tertiary level, there is a need for formal networks that improve communication and 
feedback between industry and academia.  This will enable Nicaraguan universities to 
better prepare students for competing in a global economy and assist firms as they strive 
for consistent performance improvement.  It can also improve the diffusion of 
organizational learning and technology across sectors. 
 
Firms also play a role in training.  The potential IFU-sponsored training center could 
bring great benefits to the contact center industry by reducing the costs of training and 
agglomerating best practices across firms.  It is important for existing firms to participate 
in efforts to develop and utilize such a facility, for if it is to be useful, it must meet the 
needs and expectations of the current firms.  Along with learning from the expertise of 
the Danish trainers, firms must learn from their own experiences so they may 
continuously improve processes and skills of their workforce.  While a third party 
training center can help cultivate advanced skills, firms must ultimately deliver 
specialized training to meet their specific needs.      
 
Despite significant and persistent challenges to national economic development, the 
Nicaraguan contact center industry has the potential to increase knowledge-based 
economic activity within Nicaragua, and thus increase Nicaragua’s participation in the 
global trade in business services.  
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Appendix 1 – 2005 distribution of EPZ production, and number of firms operating in 
EPZs by country 
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Source:  ProNicaragua Country Information, 2007 
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Appendix 2 – Redundant Fiber Optic Networks linked with Nicaragua 
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Appendix 3 – Typical IPA Services 
Image Building Investor Services
• Advertising in general financial media • Providing investment counseling services
• Advertising in industry-or sector-specific media • Expediting the processing of applications and 
permits
• Conducting general investment missions from source country 
to host country
• Providing postinvestment services
• Conducting general information seminars on investment 
opportunities
Investment Generation Policy Advocacy
• Engaging in direct mail or telemarketing campaigns • Participating in policy task forces
• Conducting insutry- or sector-specific investment missions 
from source country to host country or vice versa
• Developing lobbying activities
• Conducting insutry- or sector-specific information seminars • Drafting laws or policy recommendations
• Engaging in firm-specific research followed by sales 
presentations
• Reporting investors' perceptions
Source:  Wells and Wint, 2001 
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Appendix 4 – Comparison of Enrollment Statistics Among Specific Developing Nations 
numbers % numbers % numbers % numbers %
China 167,700   0.014% 99,400      0.008% 971,000    0.080% 1,238,100  0.102% 78.4%
S. Korea 163,700   0.365% 0.000% 577,400    1.286% 741,100     1.650% 77.9%
India 869,100   0.009% 0.000% 216,800    0.002% 1,085,900  0.012% 20.0%
Philippines 27,200     0.040% 121,000    0.178% 225,700    0.333% 373,900     0.551% 60.4%
Ireland 15,728     0.465% 3,450        0.102% 11,433      0.338% 30,611       0.905% 37.3%
Mexico 39,700     0.044% 64,200      0.070% 296,200    0.325% 400,100     0.439% 74.0%
Chile 8,800       0.062% 0.000% 94,300      0.664% 103,100     0.725% 91.5%
Brazil 46,300     0.029% 92,700      0.058% 149,700    0.094% 288,700     0.181% 51.9%
Costa Rica 1,100       0.032% 3,400        0.099% 7,300        0.213% 11,800       0.345% 61.9%
El Salvador 200          0.004% 2,100        0.037% 12,700      0.224% 15,000       0.265% 84.7%
Honduras 200          0.004% 2,700        0.048% 8,400        0.149% 11,300       0.200% 74.3%
Nicaragua 900          0.022% 2,300       0.056% 5,800      0.141% 9,000        0.218% 64.4%
Panama 1,900       0.072% 1,600        0.061% 12,100      0.460% 15,600       0.593% 77.6%
Country
% Engin-
eering
Technical Enrollments at Tertiary Level
Total Tech SubjectsEngineeringMath & ComputingNatural Science
Source:  UNESCO 1997 
 
 
 
 
